Peace Office Newsletter

Contested Directions in International Peacemaking

3D, R2P, and W2I

IN THIS ISSUE

Introduction

by Alain Epp Weaver

3D. R2P. W2I. This alphabet-and-number soup of abbreviations names an interrelated set of new directions in international peacebuilding theory and practice. The Responsibility to Protect (*R2P*) and the Will to Intervene (*W2I*) both emerged in Canada as responses to genocides such as the killings in Rwanda and Burundi in 1994. Both *R2P* and *W2I* grow out of the conviction that the "international community," if it is to be a reality, must develop policies and procedures to ensure that such genocides never happen again. *3D,* meanwhile, refers to governmental attempts to coordinate, or even to integrate, efforts in the realms of development, diplomacy, and defense. The Obama administration in the United States has begun using the *3D* language which had already been adopted by many other so-called "developed" countries.

For Christian pacifists, all three approaches will appear as new versions, in updated language, of older *just war* concepts. Not surprisingly, then, Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) workers in advocacy offices in Ottawa and Washington, D.C., and at the United Nations in New York would approach these new approaches with caution and skepticism. At the same time, however, these directions appear to be on their way to becoming part of the standard discourse within Western governments and the humanitarian industry, and among practitioners working at the intersection of development and peacebuilding. These concepts are thus becoming entrenched in the language and practice of different publics within which MCC operates. Avoiding these concepts is thus not an option; critical reflection is demanded.

This issue of the *Peace Office Newsletter* offers such critical reflection. Doug Hostetter of MCC's United Nations Office presents an overview and critique of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine at the United Nations. Paul Heidebrecht of MCC's Ottawa office describes the Will to Intervene initiative while also raising critical questions. Lisa Schirch, a leading theoretician and proponent of Development, Diplomacy, and Defense, is the director of the 3D Security Initiative, and a professor at Eastern Mennonite University. She presents an overview and discusses divergent understandings of the *3D* concept, and the promises and challenges facing its further development. Theo Sitther of MCC's Washington, D.C. office looks at the attempts by the U.S. military to integrate development specialists into what it calls Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. And Mary Stata, also of MCC's Washington office, examines the adoption of *3D* language by the Obama administration, including its role in the establishment and expansion of the U.S. military's AFRICOM initiative. I hope that these articles will spur further critical engagement by Christian pacifists with these new directions in international peacemaking.

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The Attempt to Increase the Militarization of International Diplomacy at the United Nations

by Doug Hostetter

We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.

—*Preamble to the United Nations Charter (1945)*

The United Nations (UN) was formed after World War Two (WWII) as an organization of sovereign states which put forward the radical idea of outlawing war as a means of solving international conflict. It went so far as to prohibit all use of military force with the exception of self-defense when attacked, or, in exceptional circumstances, when authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter in situations of grave threats to peace and international security. The UN Charter prohibits military intervention in all other cases.

The United Nations, however, was established by the victors of WWII, and tends to protect the interests of those powerful nations at the expense of the interests of others. All decisions to authorize war or peacekeeping missions at the UN are made in the Security Council. The Council is composed of five Permanent Members who have veto power, as well as ten Elected Members (the E10) chosen for a two-year term by regional groupings who have a vote, but no veto. The five Permanent Members (the P5) are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (U.S.). One might imagine how this affects the decisions as to where the UN sends peacekeeping troops. The Security Council was able to pass a resolution and send peacekeeping troops to protect the citizens of Sierra Leone or Liberia, but unable to approve a resolution to send peacekeeping forces to protect the people of Gaza (there would have been a veto by the United States) or Chechnya (there would have been a veto by Russia).

Despite the emphasis of the founders that the UN should be a forum for dialogue and diplomacy, the UN has increasingly moved to militarized "peacekeeping" as a way of resolving conflicts, especially in resource-rich Africa, the one area of the world not usually "protected" by the veto of a Permanent Member of the Security Council. Today, the UN has more troops in more places than in any time in its history. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) currently has 116,000 soldiers serving in 17 different locations around the world at an annual cost of US$7.1 billion.

Although UN peacekeeping missions have expanded enormously in recent years, some members feel the need to enlarge the scope of "peacekeeping" beyond those authorized under the UN Charter, which allows military intervention only in cases of "international threats to peace and security," not in cases of civil war or internal conflict.

The concept of "humanitarian intervention" came into popularity in the 1990s and was used prominently as a justification for the United States' war in Kosovo, for which the U.S. could not get UN approval due to the Russian veto in the Security Council. The presupposition was that in cases of genocide, or massive human rights violation of civilian populations, interventionary measures by other states was justified on humanitarian grounds. In his 1999 address to the UN General Assembly, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan challenged member states to resolve the "dilemma of . . . humanitarian intervention," and declared that the greatest challenge for the UN in the next century is to create unity behind the principle that "massive and systemic violations of human rights . . . should not be allowed to stand," while leaving open the option of "coercive" measures, undertaken by the international community in concert, to enforce accountability for such violations.

The following year, Canada and several major private foundations announced the creation of a high-level International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), co-chaired by Gareth Evans (Australia) and Mahmoud Sahnoun (Algeria). In its report, presented to the Secretary General in 2001, the Commission outlined a doctrine it termed the "Responsibility to Protect" (*R2P*).

In the words of the Commission, the term "Responsibility to Protect" reflects "the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape,

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from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The report of the Commission examines three ways in which the international community discharges the responsibility to protect—the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild.

The first and third aspects of *R2P* are uncontroversial and already within the UN mandate. It is the "responsibility to react"—the idea that when a state is incapable or refuses to address a situation that evidences a need for the protection of a population, "then interventionary measures by other members of the broader community of states may be required"—that is controversial.

A general endorsement by the United Nations of the "Responsibility to Protect" came in 2005 when the General Assembly passed the World Summit Outcome Document which declares that all states have the responsibility to protect their populations from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity." It commits the UN to protect populations from these crimes using "appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means." Should these fail, the UN member states committed themselves to taking timely action in the Security Council, leaving open the use of Chapter VII of the Charter (military force), where necessary.

There has been much debate at the UN since the passing of the World Summit Outcome Document, with strong encouragement for its codification into international law from the United States, Canada and many members of the European Union, while most of the nations from the Global South have been raising strong reservations. Rev. Miguel d'Escoto, former Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, and Maryknoll priest, President of the 63rd UN General Assembly (2009/2010), used the case of Iraq as an example of the lack of accountability for "those who might abuse the right that *R2P* would give Nation-States to resort to the use of force against other states." [In fact, Prime Minister Tony Blair had used *R2P* as the rationale for Britain to join the United States in the war against Iraq, a war that was not approved by the UN Security Council.] Rev. d'Escoto and many other diplomats from countries of the Non-Aligned Movement also question whether use of *R2P* in the practice of collective security would undermine respect for international law. They note that armed intervention under *R2P* can be used only with the approval of the Security Council which means that it will be used selectively, and only when in the interests of the five Permanent Members. In a lecture to the UN General Assembly in July 2009, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Noam Chomsky pointed out the ultimate weakness of all "humanitarian" military interventions: "virtually every use of force in international affairs has been justified in terms of *R2P*, including the worst monsters. Just to illustrate, in his scholarly study of 'humanitarian intervention,' Sean Murphy cites only three examples between the Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928 and the UN Charter in 1945: Japan's attack on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and Hitler's occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia, all accompanied by lofty rhetoric about the solemn responsibility to protect the suffering populations, and factual justifications. The basic pattern continues to the present."

The Responsibility to Protect contains many lofty sentiments. In the end however, many of us suspect that it is only a twenty-first century "just war" theory with the added refinement that these wars can be "just" only when not vetoed by one of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council. . . .

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Should MCC be mobilizing the Will To Intervene?

by Paul C. Heidebrecht

The Will to Intervene is concerned with the prevention of mass atrocities.

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Although this is a Canadian initiative, it is directed to policymakers in the United States as well.

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A basic lesson from the experience of Rwanda and Kosovo: to prevent atrocities, nations need to be convinced that intervention is in their own self interest. Shocking the consciousness of Canadians (and Americans) is not enough.

Mobilizing. Will. Intervene. One would expect that Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) advocacy offices would use words like these appreciatively—perhaps even to describe their own work. One might even expect many Mennonites to use words like these to describe the manner in which MCC's relief, development, and peacemaking work is carried out. MCC is an institution shaped by the marshalling of grassroots support, and the dedication of staff, service workers, volunteers, and partners who come together to roll up their sleeves and get their hands dirty trying to improve the lives of people around the world. In recent months, however, these words have come to have a more precise meaning in certain contexts. In what follows I will briefly describe what is meant by the phrase "Will to Intervene" (*W2I*) in political discourse, and why MCC should have reservations about efforts to mobilize that will.

The first piece of background information to note about *W2I* is that it is a research project—thus far it is not a policy, doctrine, or even a movement. Secondly, it is concerned with the prevention of mass atrocities. Originating in 2007, *W2I* is a project of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (MIGS) at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec. *W2I* is co-directed by Frank Chalk, the Director of MIGS and a Professor of History at Concordia, and Roméo Dallaire, a Senior Fellow at MIGS who is currently serving as a Senator in the Government of Canada. Dallaire has had a distinguished career in the Canadian military, but is perhaps best known for his role as the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda in 1994. The third thing to note is that, although this is a Canadian initiative, it is directed to policymakers in the United States as well as Canada. The project has a Research Steering Committee and an Academic Consultation Group that include a number of academics from both countries, and, along with high-profile Canadian political figures ranging from Ed Broadbent to Michael Ignatieff, it also includes at least one high-profile American, Ted Koppel. Finally, it is important to note that *W2I* is an academic project that strives to make an impact on the agenda of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)

and the media, as well as public policy debates within government. The publication of its first report, *Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Atrocities,* in September, 2009, was accompanied by launch events in Ottawa and Washington, D.C. Those events received widespread media coverage in Canada. All page references below are to this report.

If the basic objective of the *W2I* project is to find ways to prevent mass atrocities, the underlying premise is that "the key to mobilizing international support to prevent mass atrocities is to garner domestic support" (viii). This premise is based upon the Responsibility to Protect (*R2P*) doctrine, an earlier Canadian innovation that has received considerable support at the United Nations in the past decade. In fact, *W2I* seeks "to operationalize *R2P* principles in Canada and the United States to parallel efforts being made in the international realm" (viii).

The project's researchers began by examining the contrasting international responses to mass atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo, conducting interviews with more than 80 foreign policy practitioners and "opinion shapers" in Canada and the U.S.. They then developed recommendations for the governments of both countries that were unique to each context, but clustered in three categories: enabling leadership, enhancing coordination, and building capacity. The researchers also developed a set of recommendations for civil society and the news media in both countries under the rubric of ensuring knowledge.

At bottom, these recommendations are derived from a basic lesson from the experience of Rwanda and Kosovo: in order to mobilize the will to prevent atrocities, nations do not need to be convinced that they have a moral obligation to intervene. Rather, they need to be convinced that intervention is in their own self interest. Moral arguments alone, even when coupled with legal arguments, have not carried sufficient weight to generate action. What needs to be emphasized, according to *W2I*, is that intervention should be framed as a concern for our own health, prosperity, and security, not altruism. As General Dallaire put it in an interview published in *Foreign Policy* maga-

zine in September, 2009: "Genocide and mass atrocities not only shock the conscience of Canadians, but in today's globalized village also indirectly threaten our national security and interests." Shocking the consciousness of Canadians (and Americans) is not enough.

Certainly this approach is strikingly utilitarian, and this in and of itself may be enough to make Christians and humanitarians question *W2I*, especially those who already doubt the motivations of those promoting the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Having said this, connections are drawn in both directions by *W2I* researchers. For example, they argue that poverty and climate change need to be viewed as "drivers of deadly violence," not only that our own public health and security systems bear a financial burden from violence in faraway places (5–8).

Furthermore, in my view it is helpful to redirect attention to the kind of effort that would be required to make *R2P* truly operational, since this effort in and of itself does not depend upon armed intervention. Indeed, *W2I* is fundamentally concerned with preventing mass atrocities. It is concerned with putting in place measures that make genocide unlikely, rather than implementing reactive or corrective action after the fact, recognizing that it is a lot easier to prevent genocide than to stop it. To be sure, all of the questions raised at the Ottawa launch of *W2I* focused on re-hashing Rwanda and Kosovo, not to mention events in Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, and Sudan. Yet Dallaire and Chalk repeatedly insisted that their desire was to move the conversation "away from the crisis mode." And while unapologetically appealing to just war arguments, at one point Dallaire stated quite forcefully that his desire was to "push the use of force, which should always be a last resort, even further out on the horizon by focusing more attention on prevention." This sounds like a good thing to Mennonite ears.

Nonetheless, there is much about "Will to Intervene" that should leave an organization committed to Christian nonviolence uneasy. Crucially, the recommendations of this project that center on enhancing coordination within the Canadian and U.S. governments would have the effect of strengthening the connections among defense, diplomacy, and development efforts (*3D*) that are already in place. In Canada this is reflected in the recommendation that an interdepartmental Coordinating Office for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities be created. As Member

of Parliament Bob Rae put it: "I think we have to use the resources that we have more effectively. Between CIDA [Canadian International Development Agency], Defence, and Foreign Affairs, we need to look at how we can more deeply integrate those departments" (32). In the United States this is reflected in the recommendation that the President create an Atrocities Prevention Committee to coordinate interagency policy, and the National Security Advisor create an Interagency Policy Committee on Preventing Mass Atrocities to coordinate policy across the executive branch. In short, *W2I* presumes that *3D* is a great idea.

Of course, arguing that a "whole-of-government" approach to tackling global problems as urgent and potentially catastrophic as genocide is uncontroversial, and welcomed by groups across the political spectrum. So too is encouraging governments to make the prevention of mass atrocities a policy priority. However, the *W2I* project not only recommends enhanced coordination, but the building of military capacity. Indeed, the most striking recommendation is that "the Government of Canada continue enhancing the Canadian Forces' capabilities by increasing force strength" (ix). The report argues that Canada "must be better prepared to confront the new security challenges of the 21st century," and thus "recommends that the Canadian Forces be allocated sufficient resources to recruit and retain more soldiers to strengthen the military overall—and the land forces in particular—so that Canada can make greater contributions to international peace and security" (42). This recommendation comes at a time when military spending in Canada is already at its highest level since World War II, and is projected to rise by an additional 50 percent over the next two decades.

Thus it is not hard to see why "Will to Intervene" should cause concern for MCC, especially in Canada. For all the talk of "soft power," *W2I* is pushing for more, not less, capacity in "hard power." And it is this push that has attracted attention in media reports, and has bolstered the project's credibility among certain elements of the Canadian electorate. For example, in an op-ed piece published in the Toronto *Globe and Mail* on September 21, 2009, former Conservative strategist Tom Flanagan argued that "these people deserve our attention when they talk about genocide. Although perhaps tilting more liberal than conservative in their outlook, they are not mushy-headed idealists

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Further Resources

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Chomsky, Noam. "The Responsibility to Protect." Lecture given at UN General Assembly, New York City, July 23, 2009.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect.* Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. *Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Atrocities.* Montreal: The Will to Intervene Project and Concordia University, 2009.

Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.* Public Affairs, 2004.

The MCC Peace Committee meeting in October 2007 included discussion of the plan to establish AFRICOM announced by President George W. Bush on February 12, 2007. A brief report appears in the July–October 2008 (38:3) *Peace Office Newsletter.*

ONLINE RESOURCES

For 3D

"3D Security Initiative." www.3dsecurity.org. Website of the organization of which Lisa Schirch is director.

For the Responsibility to Protect

"The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty." www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp. Contains the text of the original report that launched R2P.

International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. www.responsibilitytoprotect.org.

Responsibility to Protect Coalition. www.r2pcoalition.org.

Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. globalr2P.org

For the Will to Intervene

Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/W2Iproject.html. On the site one can access the report, *Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Mass Atrocities,* along with the Will to Intervene blog and other W2I resources.

obsessed with soft power. They know that in a brutal world, it is often necessary to use force." The take-home message for Flanagan and many others appears to be that "peaceful measures, such as publicity, condemnation and boycotts, should be tried first, but if all else fails, we must not shy from military intervention." It thus remains to be seen whether *W2I* really does represent a shift in priorities.

Notes

Dickinson, Elizabeth. "Interview: Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire." *Foreign Policy*, September 21, 2009.

Flanagan, Tom. "Intervening abroad: Do we have the means to match our will?" *Globe and Mail,* September 22, 2009.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. *The Responsibility to Protect.* Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, 2001.

Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies. *Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership and Action to Prevent Atrocities.* Montreal: The Will to Intervene Project and Concordia University, 2009.

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Security in 3D

by Lisa Schirch

Mennonites have been on the forefront of resisting war and militarism, of laying out alternative ways of handling conflict, and helping found the field of peacebuilding. A *3D* approach to security brings these two traditions—resistance and designing alternatives—together.

"*3D*" stands for Development, Diplomacy, and Defense. But a "*3D*" approach to security means different things to different people. To some, it signals three separate approaches that each accomplish unique goals. In this case, sustainable *Development* is the foundation of security, of alleviating poverty, of supporting functioning citizen-focused state institutions and a robust civil society. Multi-track *Diplomacy* addresses deep-rooted conflict through high-level negotiations and civil-society-led peacebuilding to prevent or end wars. *Defense,* ideally, is a last resort when development and diplomatic efforts fail to prevent crime and violence. It should focus on population-centric policing and peacekeeping that protects the safety of civilians and maintains law and order.

To others, *3D* means integrating all three into a unified objective such as counterterrorism, with military force in the lead and development and diplomacy subordinate to and supporting these hard security objectives.

In other words, the concept of *3D* itself is contested. Is this a whole new era of foreign policy that relies less on coercion and does more to address the root causes of global insecurity? Or is *3D* the militarization of

development and diplomacy in support of old-school notions of national security?

A *3D* security framework creates opportunities such as more protection of civilians, fewer wars and deaths, increased funding for development and diplomacy, decreased reliance on the military, and decreased conflict between development, diplomacy, and defense personnel in crisis situations. The *3D* approach also brings dangers and challenges such as increased politicization and militarization of development and diplomacy programs, and therefore increased danger to nongovernmental groups carrying out development and peacebuilding activities on the ground.

Opportunities for the Changing Face of Security

3D is related to a variety of other new ways of talking about security. Joseph Nye's book *Soft Power* describes the over-reliance on U.S. military or "hard power" coercion internationally, and the underutilization and investment in "soft power" ways of influencing and persuading international allies and adversaries through development and diplomacy. As the failure of United States policy in Iraq became widely acknowledged, Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies then came out with a commissioned report on "Smart Power." The Smart Power Commission described the need for the U.S. to invest more in development and diplomacy rather than continually over-emphasizing "hard power" responses. General David Petraeus meanwhile announced that there was no military solution in Iraq,

and that the solution would have to be economic and political.

At the United Nations, a variety of new developments evolved related to the concept of *3D*. First, a new U.N. Peacebuilding Commission began to coordinate efforts to address the root causes of conflict. Second, the U.N. Commission on Human Security helped to launch the widening of narratives and goals beyond national security. *Human* security as a concept contrasts with *national* security goals—although some would say complements. There is much debate about the meaning of the term "human security" and whether it only includes immediate direct threats (referred to as "freedom from fear") or whether it also includes the addressing of root causes of preventable deaths from hunger and disease (also known as "freedom from want"). See table at lower right.

In the international realm, Canadians began using the *3D* discourse for their foreign policy. European countries adopted the *3D* framework as they shifted to a greater emphasis on preventing violent conflicts and "stabilizing" countries before or after war. The United States was one of the last Western countries to start using *3D* language. In her 2009 Congressional confirmation, the new U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced her intention to pursue a "*3D*" foreign policy using a multidimensional toolkit of development, diplomacy, and defense.

There are three broad challenges to implementation of the new *3D* human security rhetoric.

1. Learn to be "Partners, not Patrons"

In a number of recent speeches, the Obama Administration has introduced the phrase "partners, not patrons" to describe the relationship of the U.S. to security in other countries. Yet nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States continue to take a top-down approach rather than seeing security as growing from the ground up.

Afghan and Iraqi civil society leaders who are responsible for community development and local reconciliation efforts are often overlooked or undermined by these top-down efforts. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams set up in both countries have the explicit goal of harmonizing a *3D* approach and fostering civil society. But in both countries, there is an already-robust civil society that frequently expresses its dissatisfaction for how it is left out of decision-making and undermined by international efforts to bolster a corrupt government.

President Obama's own background in community organizing needs to be applied to U.S. foreign policy. A top-down approach without real partnerships with and support for civil society will fail. It is impossible to impose development or democracy plans onto local "host" nations. Rather, the United States needs to work in partnership with people abroad to develop home-grown, traditional forms of participatory democracy, diplomatic efforts, and locally-guided development. Security and stability require a combination of a citizen-oriented state held to account by an active civil society.

3D security will require shifting global perceptions about an "America that imposes its will on others" to an "America that works in partnership with the global community." Real *3D* policy changes will seek to engage the world community as equal partners in a mutual effort to build global security.

2. Keep focus, but also communicate

Communication between those people implementing the goals of each of the three D's is important. Civil-military relations require different levels of contact in different contexts, from full cooperation by the many respondents to the Haiti earthquake in early 2010 to minimal levels of communication in war zones where Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) want the humanitarian space they say that neutrality affords them. The coordination of *3D* security offers the possibility of what military actors call "de-confliction" to reduce internal conflicts among development, diplomacy, and defense personnel who often work at cross-purposes on the ground. But blending the *3D*s together brings danger. NGOs in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, complain that insurgents seeking U.S. targets hit American government-funded development projects. Some local people refuse to work with any U.S. development project because they perceive it to be aiming to achieve military rather than humanitarian goals.

A "*3D*" approach to security means different things to different people.

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A top-down approach to foreign policy without real partnerships with and support for civil society will fail.

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Unless there is a shift of security dollars, the military will be the default foreign policy operator of the United States.

HUMAN SECURITY	NATIONAL SECURITY
1. Focus on well-being of individuals and communities	1. Focus on territory and economic interests of the nation
2. Interdependent with global security	2. Relatively isolated from global security
3. Draws on multi-track efforts at all levels of society	3. Draws primarily on military armed actors
4. Budget requires investment in preventive efforts in development and diplomacy	4. Budget geared toward offensive military capacity

A *3D* approach is more likely to be effective at building long-term security if each element communicates with the others, but keeps the integrity of its specific mission. *Development* addresses poverty, *diplomacy* addresses political conflict, and *defense*, ideally, focuses on public safety. A U.S. "whole-of-government", "inter-agency", or "comprehensive approach" pulls government personnel from the State Department, Defense Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) outside of their individual silos to think and talk together about security challenges. But in order for development and diplomacy to be effective in their unique missions, the respective U.S. agencies need to keep focused on those missions. USAID and State Department programs and budgets should not be hijacked toward short-term military counter-terrorism efforts aimed at winning hearts and minds. Development and diplomacy require a patient, long-term approach to address poverty and build good governance in fragile states.

3. The Budget Elephant in the Room

A new United States foreign policy is not possible without matching a *3D* strategy to smarter resource planning. There are vast inequities in U.S. budgets for development, diplomacy, and defense. The military budget is too big and full of waste. The development and diplomacy budgets are too small and contain too many earmarks for special interests and program restrictions set by Congress. The civilian agencies responsible for development and diplomacy are so chronically under-funded that they don't even have the planners to consider what they might do with greater resources. So each year Congress hesitates to give them money that they don't know how to spend.

Unless there is a shift of security dollars from the Defense Department to the State Department and USAID, the military will be the default foreign policy operator of the United States. Even Secretary of Defense Gates chastises Congress' under-funding of U.S. civilian agencies. The United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries reflect their commitment to civilian expertise in development and diplomacy with budgets to match.

Africa as a case study of a *3D* approach?

Many African peacebuilding experts say that Africa's security challenges share a common denominator: *poverty*. They note that good governance and economic *development* are linked to greater security across the con-

tinent. They would like to see the United States and other countries do much more to address the root causes of instability in Africa such as:

- Support efforts to ensure basic health care facilities and low-cost drugs.

- Support sustainable development projects that anticipate growing competition over scarce resources, and the climate change implications.

- Promote debt forgiveness programs to free up needed capital into economic development while promoting positive messages to the African public.

- Foster transparent, accountable government to combat corruption.

Africa's security also hinges on its *diplomatic* capacity to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict. African peacebuilders are creating a vast, multi-leveled infrastructure for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in countries like Ghana and Kenya. Diplomatic efforts to bring together political opponents to find workable solutions are necessary. Diplomacy is also needed to reform international trade practices that stymie African development, inhibit the growth of African economies and punish African farmers.

Africa's security depends on *defense* focused on peacekeeping capacity and resources for regional security organizations like the African Union. For decades, foreign governments have propped up corrupt and violent dictators in Africa. Selling weapons to countries with human rights violations has brought greater instability and violence. African civil society leaders plead with the international community to instead support regional security organizations that require member states to agree together when military force is to be used to protect and prevent further violence.

Conclusion

At its best, a *3D* approach to security provides links to a broader analysis of current security threats that include climate change, disease, and spreading poverty. It responds to these threats by addressing the root causes of violence through more effective and robust diplomatic efforts, and with changes to international trade and development policies. A more effective "first resort" to address global conflicts and crises through development and diplomacy could help to ease the current over-reliance on the expensive and dangerous "last resort" of military defense.

At the heart of the issue is how any country decides to use a *3D* approach. Is the goal of U.S. foreign policy, for example, based on a human-security paradigm that values the safety of individuals and communities at home and abroad? Or are new "soft power" tools of development and diplomacy simply being harnessed to secure U.S. oil and geo-political goals? This conversation on values and goals is the conversation that needs to happen in Washington, D.C.

Mennonites often preach about the separa-tion of church and state. We have critiqued the state with few efforts to dig in and try to change the way it works. Yet prominent theologians such as John Howard Yoder and Walter Wink affirm a role for pacifists in seeking the redemption of "fallen" institu-tions that may be harming rather than help-ing human security. But we Mennonites in the United States should not abstain from these current challenges so as to protect a naive theological purity that pretends that we are somehow separate and don't benefit from a U.S. foreign policy that sometimes seeks U.S. interests at the expense of the interests of people in other countries. Rather, it is time for those in a more pragmatic Menno-nite peacebuilding tradition to move toward and become more deeply engaged in a *3D* approach. Doing so is more likely to benefit the interests of the global rather than merely the United States community.

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A more effective "first resort" to address global crises could help to ease the current over-reliance on the expensive and dangerous "last resort" of military defense.

Militarized Aid in Afghanistan

by Theo Sitther

After months of debate, deliberation and speculation, United States President Obama announced his strategy for Afghani-stan on December 1, 2009. This strategy includes the deployment of an additional 30,000 U.S. military forces as well as a civil-ian strategy for diplomacy, reconstruction and development. The U.S. war in Afghani-stan has dragged on for over eight years, foreign forces on the ground have continued a fight with no end in sight, and the develop-ment and humanitarian needs of the country have remained dire.

The Obama administration does recognize that *success* in Afghanistan includes a viable reconstruction and development strategy, although U.S. engagement in the country over the last eight years has heavily focused on the military and has largely neglected the basic human needs of Afghan citizens. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, with much of the population lacking access to basic health care, educa-tion, food and other needs. And decades of conflict have left much of the countryside in shambles.

Much of the development aid in recent years from the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies has been channeled through military means. The aid has been integrated into a counter-insurgency strategy which aims to "win the hearts and minds" of the Afghan popula-tion to gain their trust in order to defeat the insurgents. This form of militarized develop-ment aid is often carried out by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Provincial Reconstruction Teams are military units with civilian personnel embedded in them, and are responsible for development and reconstruction efforts. The use of PRTs in Afghanistan has become widely accepted as the new model for development. This, how-ever, presents some serious problems.

First, to tie development to a military/ security strategy undermines long-term sus-tainable development. The military often lacks the capacity, expertise and knowledge to carry out development and reconstruc-tion projects. According to a report by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, some PRT members reported dissatisfaction due to lack of plan-ning and coordination by units engaged in "short-term 'feel good' projects (with success measured by money spent or sat-isfaction of the local governor) without consideration of larger strategic and capac-ity-building implications." Furthermore, in a report to Congress the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction stated that "there has been no standardized measurement of the effectiveness of the PRT program . . . no metrics have been devised to provide data on the quality, impact, and usefulness of PRTs and their efforts. While

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The militarization of development infringes on humanitarian space.

PRTs have collected data such as projects completed or dollars spent, these figures are inadequate to determine a Provincial Reconstruction Team's effectiveness." The absence of adequate monitoring and evaluation instruments means that money and time may continue to be invested in unsustainable and ineffective projects.

In addition, the military is not equipped to plan and implement development projects just as a development agency or a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) is not equipped for counterinsurgency operations. Even though a development adviser is supposed to make up part of each PRT, the sheer number of military personnel often drowns out the voices of development professionals.

Furthermore, because the military as an institution is designed and trained for security purposes and not for development, the use of the military for development and reconstruction projects tends to focus efforts in areas where it serves strategic security interests rather than where it is most needed. NGOs and development agencies, on the other hand, intend to respond to communities that are most in need. NGOs are often better positioned to make a long-term commitment for sustainable development, whereas the military may shift its resources and efforts due to changes in the security situation or shifts in deployment cycles.

Second, the use of the military to carry out development projects in Afghanistan means that much-needed resources are taken up by the PRT program that could otherwise be used for long-term sustainable development projects that work to meet human need. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a program that provides funding directly to a commander to be spent on development efforts, and is a primary funding source for the PRTs. In the coming year, funding CERP will be $1.2 billion. This amount is higher than the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) global education budget, and it exceeds the total amount the Afghan government spends on health and education.

Third, the militarization of development infringes on humanitarian space. "Humanitarian space" generally refers to the independence and neutrality of development and relief agencies from military and political groups. Aid and development are provided to the areas where they are most needed rather than used instrumentally as a way to meet a strategic military goal. When the military engages in humanitarian operations

it blurs the line between military roles and civilian aid and development roles. Sustainable development should be independent of and neutral to military and political allegiances. Many NGOs have worked in Afghanistan for decades by building trust and crossing the lines of conflict to provide aid to those who need it. Humanitarian principles, not military strategy, should guide development.

Soon after President Obama's December 2009 announcement, I joined other Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) staff on a visit to Afghanistan to meet with partners to get their perspective on U.S. strategy. All of our partners agreed that the PRT program is a failure. They cited several examples of failed PRT projects. One example was a school that was built by a PRT for 1000 students when in fact the population of the village was only about one hundred families. Without assessing the needs of villagers, the military in this case assumed that building a school would foster good will in the community. In the end the school was never used and the money was wasted.

On the one hand the military needs to be knowledgeable and sensitive to the development needs of a community. On the other hand, direct engagement in development projects should not be a role for the military. The military should not engage in activities where it lacks expertise, experience and mandate. U.S. development funds can go to support Afghan-led efforts such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which is an Afghan government program for rural development. The NSP has shown great success in responding to the development needs of communities because it seeks to empower them. MCC partners in Afghanistan encouraged us to support models of development that are led by Afghans, rather than a top-down imposed model.

Peace is possible in Afghanistan, but only through genuine efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty, conflict and insecurity. This means that the U.S. and other donor governments must be willing to make long-term commitments to development rather than opting for a short-term, quick-impact militarized strategy that has proven ineffective in meeting the basic human needs of the Afghan people.

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True Change or More of the Same?
Why the Obama Administration's foreign policy is not as radical as some may think

by Mary Stata

A New Direction

The 2008 election of Barack Obama signaled a shift in the tone and tenor of U.S. foreign policy. After years of policies that prioritized military intervention and unilateralism, the advent of the Obama administration promised to embrace nuance and multilateral engagement. For many this was a breath of fresh air.

A year into Obama's presidency, "*3D*", "smart power" and "whole of government" have replaced "Global War on Terror" and "Axis of Evil" as the favored foreign policy catch phrases. While it was easy for many in the peace community to reject the Bush doctrine writ large, Obama's more nuanced and integrated approach also merits close scrutiny and criticism.

In 2009, President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered several landmark speeches that articulated their vision for a renewed emphasis on diplomacy and development as essential foreign policy tools. Under this framework, defense would no longer be the primary face of U.S. engagement with the world. Rather, *development* and *diplomacy* would be elevated as equal pillars of U.S. foreign policy alongside *defense*. Dubbed the "*3D*" approach, this would equip the United States to face the challenges of the twenty-first century more effectively than a purely militaristic approach.

As the United States grapples with the fragmentation of power in a multi-polar world and transnational issues such as climate change and infectious disease, the *3D* framework advocates for a foreign policy that reflects and prepares for these emerging and interwoven issues. In sum, this foreign policy is enamored with pragmatism and sympathetic to engagement.

As Secretary Clinton noted in a speech last July, "Rigid ideologies and old formulas don't apply"[1] anymore. It is clear, however, that this new *3D* formula needs some work. While it is refreshing to hear development and diplomacy regarded as legitimate for-

eign policy tools, neither the State Department nor the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) maintain the political or institutional clout to compete with the Department of Defense. Until their budgets and personnel gain parity, development and diplomacy will remain the neglected cousins of the Pentagon.

The National Security Lens

President Obama and Secretary Clinton are quick to justify their emphasis on diplomacy and development as necessary to national security. However, as long as development and diplomatic efforts are justified by and shrouded in a national security framework, they will likely not succeed. Sustainable development will emerge and flourish when it is designed and executed to meet human need rather than used as an instrument of military security. As long as a national security lens is imposed on development, these initiatives will remain short-sighted, ineffective, and even counterproductive. Further, development will inevitably remain subordinate and subjugated to the Pentagon's wishes.

Rather than mitigating or preventing armed conflict in the first place, a whole-of-government approach, it seems, merely provides a way to execute military operations *better*. Beyond the budget inferiority and institutional shortcomings of the U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a central paradox exists within the integrated *3D* approach; military actions, which result in destruction and trauma, are incompatible with development and diplomacy which seek to build, empower, and connect people. Even though the military engages in a variety of activities, it is undeniable that its central function is to exert power through force and coercion. The fundamental purpose of defense/war runs counter to the aims and modus operandi of development and diplomacy. This is the central flaw of the *3D* approach.

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AFRICOM: Glimpse of a *3D* future

The establishment of the military US Command for Africa (AFRICOM) in 2007 means that U.S. military activity now overshadows diplomacy and development in Africa. The emerging geo-political and geo-strategic importance of the region to the United States comes as a result of the spread of terrorism and of greater oil production on the African continent. Formed under the George W. Bush administration, AFRICOM consolidates U.S. military operations in Africa under one military command. The establishment of this new command has led to suspicion from African governments and concern from civil society.

In general, with the exception of Liberia that offered to host AFRICOM, African nations were afraid a U.S. military command on the continent "would heighten American leverage, alter the regional balance of power, and be divisive and destabilizing" to the host country and the region.[2]

An additional concern is that AFRICOM is part of a further militarization of America's foreign policy. AFRICOM is somewhat unique as a command because it was formed with the intention of embracing the *3D* approach. Several U. S. Department of Defense officials have called AFRICOM a "combatant command 'plus,'" referring to the command's "soft power" mission, which incorporates development and diplomacy.[3]

While other U.S. commands have some degree of civilian integration, AFRICOM is intended to fully reflect the *3D* mission of current U.S. foreign policy by integrating staff from the State Department, USAID, and other government agencies into its structure.[4] But the precedence of defense over development and diplomacy in AFRICOM means that instability in Africa will be handled primarily through military "solutions" that fail to get to the root causes of the instability.

Because AFRICOM seeks to combine military and civilian operations, the roles of American military and civilian personnel will blur.[5] In addition to sending a confusing message to African civilians, this approach leads to the politicizing of humanitarian space[6] and therefore runs the danger of putting development and humanitarian workers at risk of attack by insurgent forces since their work is no longer viewed as neutral.[7]

The Obama administration is continuing the Bush policies by increasing AFRICOM's budget and expanding foreign military assistance and military training programs to African countries. AFRICOM's formidable budget and personnel numbers far outweigh that of the State Department and USAID.

This imbalance of resources not only runs the risk of over-militarizing small and underdeveloped nations, but also becomes the face of U.S. foreign policy for Africa. Giving unquestioning priority to military expansion over investment in sustainable economic development ensures a continuation of the colonial cycle of poverty and insecurity for the people of Africa. The United States must dramatically change its current policy course for Africa by heavily investing in programs that promote democracy, human rights, and economic wellbeing.

Change is Still Possible

A year into office, President Obama has sought to revitalize relationships abroad by redirecting U.S. foreign policy. In order to succeed, the administration must clearly delineate and separate the roles of civilians and military personnel, dramatically increase civilian agency budgets and capacity, and prioritize long-term development over shortsighted national security interests. Until this happens, Obama's much ballyhooed change will remain elusive.

Notes

1. Clinton, Hillary. Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations. Washington, DC. 15 July 2009.

2. Laurie Nathan (2009), "AFRICOM: A Threat to Africa's Security," *Contemporary Security Policy* 30:1, 59.

African voices that have been in favor of AFRICOM, like the government of Liberia, have focused on the potential to receive increased resources due to the U.S. presence on the continent.

3. Ploch, 4–5.

4. AFRICOM website, http://www.africom.mil/ AboutAFRICOM.asp

5. "Media Briefing Booklet on the Occasion of President Barack Obama's Visit to Ghana," *Foreign Policy In Focus, Institute for Policy Studies,* July 10, 2009, 4. http://www.fpif.org

6. The phrase "humanitarian space" refers to neutral zones occupied by humanitarian aid agencies in regions experiencing armed conflict.

7. "Media Briefing . . .," 3.

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